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Sister Teresa Benedicta of the Cross, better known by her name in the world as 
Edith Stein, was beatified on 1 May 1987. The process for her beatification was 
introduced in the early sixties by the then Archbishop of Cologne, and it 
proceeded as that of a martyr. She was canonised on 11 October 1998, and was 
further honoured by Pope John Paul II when she was made Patroness of Europe, 
along with Catherine of Sienna and Birgitta of Sweden, on 1 October 1999 - in a 
gesture to complement the existing patronage of Sts Benedict, Cyril and 
Methodius1. 
 
In the encyclical Fides et Ratio she is pointed out as one of those thinkers who in 
recent times illustrates the fruitful relationship between philosophy and the Word 
of God (74), the others mentioned being John Henry Newman, Antonio Rosmini, 
Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson2. Among these, she is the only martyr. 
 
The association of martyrdom with philosophy is rare, but it is not entirely 
unprecedented. In fact, both patron saints of Philosophy died as martyrs. St. Justin 
Martyr (ca. 103-165) was a pagan philosopher who after his conversion to 
Christianity instituted a school of Christian philosophy in Rome, and who wrote 
(among other things) two apologies and the Dialogue with Trypho. He was 
                                                 
1 For a detailed account of the process, see Sullivan, John: “The Path to Beatification” in Herbstrith, 
Waltraud O.C.D.: Never Forget, Carmelite Studies 7, ICS Publications, Washington, 1998. 
2 Vladimir S. Soloviev, Pavel A. Florensky, Petr Chaadaev and Vladimir Lossky are mentioned from 
the Eastern context. 
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beheaded at the request of the Prefect Rusticus of Rome forbeing a Christian. St. 
Catherine of Alexandria (+ 307) was known as a Christian philosopher who was 
imprisoned for objecting to sacrifice to the Emperor. She converted fifty scholars 
to Christianity while she was awaiting her execution. She was tortured on a wheel 
and beheaded.  
 
Edith Stein, however, is our contemporary. John Paul II has called her a 
‘paradigmatic figure’3  and a ‘symbol embodying the deepest tragedy and the 
deepest hopes of Europe’4. There is a special link between John Paul II and Edith 
Stein. His reasons for pointing her out provide the framework for this study5. I 
suggest that these reasons can be divided into three categories: the personal, the 
practical and the objective. These will be treated in turn under the following 
headings: 1. Edith Stein as mirror; 2. Edith Stein as symbol and 3. Edith Stein as 
philosopher. 
 
 
1. Edith Stein as Mirror 
 
In the Magna Moralia, a Greek philosophical work attributed to Aristotle, the 
mirror is used as an analogue of the friend: friends are alike and have much in 
common; they 'explain' one another by intimate illustration. Stein and Wojtyla 
                                                 
3 Weigel, George: Witness to Hope. The Biography of Pope John Paul II, Harper Collins, 1999, p. 
540. 
4 Pope John Paul II: Apostolic letter issued motu proprio proclaiming Saint Bridget of Sweden, Saint 
Catherine of Siena and Saint Teresa Benedicta of the Cross co-patronesses of Europe, 1 October 1999 
(3.). 
5Other studies have compared their philosophies or their lives, see for example: Kalinowski, Georges: 
"Edith Stein et Karol Wojtula sur la personne" in Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 82:4 (1984), p. 
545-561. Reprinted in Autour de "Personne et Acte" de Karol Wojtyla: Articles et Conferences sur une 
rencontre du thomisme avec la phenomenologie, Presses Universitaires d'Aix en Marseille, Aix en 
Provence, 1987; Haarlammert, Klaus: "Johannes vom Kreuz stand am Anfang. Zwischen Leben und 
Wirken Edith Steins und Johannes Paulus II, gibt es zahlreiche und uberraschende Verbindungen", in 
Edith Stein - Leben im Zeichen des Kreuzes, Ed. by Klaus Haarlammert, Speyer, Pilger Verlag, 1987, 
p. 45 - 52; Cecilia, M.: "Edith Stein e il magistero di Giovanni Paolo II nella 'Redemptoris Mater'" in 
Revista di Vita Spirituale 49:2 (1995), p. 62 - 70; Maria Cecilia del Volto Santo: "Edith Stein e il 
magistero di Giovanni Paolo II nella 'Mulieris dignitatem'" in Rivista di Vita Spirituale, 50 (1996), p. 
23 -37; Garcia, Laura: "The Primacy of Persons: Edith Stein and Pope John Paul II" in Logos: A 
Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture, 1:2 (Summer 1997), p. 90 - 99; Sakowicz, Eugeniusz: "Jan 
Pawel II o Edycie Stein" in Szukajac prawdy: Edyta Stein w kulturze polskiej, ed. Anita Czarniecka-
Stefanska, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego, Wroclaw, 1998, p. 9 - 14.    
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have much in common: they have places, masters, pursuits and problems in 
common, but each relates to these in slightly different ways. Because of these 
slight differences they 'illustrate' one another, in the same way that family 
members shed a curious light upon one another. 
 
a. Common places 
 
Both Stein and Wojtyla were born in what is today Poland. Stein was born in 
Breslau (today Wroclaw), in the province of Silesia, 150 miles northwest of 
Krakow. Stein’s family on both sides came from the little town of Lubliniz 
(Lubliniec), half way between Breslau and Krakow, and about twenty miles west 
of Chestochowa.  
 
Wadowice, Wojtyla’s birthplace, is some twenty miles southwest of Krakow, in 
the province of Galicia. It is situated only about ten miles southeast of Auschwitz 
(Oswiecim), which still lies within the boundaries of Upper Silesia. It was in 
Krakow that Wojtyla would enter the clandestine seminary in the autumn of 1942. 
It was in Auschwitz that Stein was to die  around 9 August 1942: Wojtyla was 
then twenty-two years of age, and Stein fifty-one. The few days or hours Stein 
spent in the extermination camp of Auschwitz, Wojtyla is likely to have spent 
working in the Solvay chemical factory, some thirty miles away. 
 
Breslau was Prussian when Stein was a child, and she identified herself as 
German, not as Polish. When Lublinitz became Polish after the First World War 
her mother’s family sold their property and some moved to Oppeln (which 
remained German), only thirty miles west, whereas others went to Berlin to 
establish themselves there. They were all pro-German and German-speakers. 
However, to Stein’s mother Lublinitz remained ‘home’, and Stein herself would 
often visit the place as a child, together with her siblings. As they were allowed to 
please themselves and were not over-supervised in Lublinitz, the place was like a 
haven. 
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Wojtyla is of course Polish and of Polish origin. His parents came from Bielsko-
Biala, forty miles southwest of Krakow. His father spoke German and taught it to 
Karol, but Karol’s native language was Polish. The father also introduced him to 
the Polish romanticism of Sienkiewicz, Mickiewicz, Slowacki and Norwid, all 
singing the glory of the 'non-country' Poland. Galicia being as close to Silesia as 
Derry is to Donegal, it may be justified to say that our two personages were from 
the same country, but of different nationalities. 
 
In Wadowice around 20% of the population was Jewish. Wojtyla remembers the 
father of his Jewish childhood friend as a Polish patriot, who fought with the 
Polish in the battle of Vistula which won the Poles their precarious restoration of 
nationhood after the First World War. Stein’s active involvement in the First 
World War as a nurse at the Russian front testifies to her patriotism also, this time 
on the side of the Germans6. The Jews of Central Europe were very much part of 
the life of the nations in which they lived, but with the rise of Nazism, and 
especially with the invasion of Poland, Jews and Poles came to have something in 
common: they both had their 'living' space converted into National-Socialist 
Lebensraum. 
 
However, Germany meant not only Nazism but also Göttingen:  “Dear Gottingen! 
[Stein exclaims] I do believe only someone who studied there between 1905 and 
1914, in the brief flowering time of the Göttingen School of Phenomenology, can 
appreciate all that the name evokes in us”7. Wojtyla, of course, did not study in 
Göttingen, indeed he was not yet born at the time when its school of 
phenomenology was flourishing. Yet the life of the Göttingen Circle and its vivid 
discussions would become familiar to him through his studies of Scheler, who, like 
Stein and Wojtyla, had come to Göttingen drawn by phenomenology. 
 
Analecta Husserliana tried, in1971, under the leadership of Anna-Teresa 
Tyminienka, to rekindle the spirit of Husserl's Jahrbuch für Philosophie und 
                                                 
6The correspondence with Roman Ingarden is particularly interesting in this regard. Ingarden was a 
Polish nationalist, and he and Stein often discussed issues relating to nationality and the state. See 
band XIV of Edith Steins Werke. 
7 Stein: Life in a Jewish Family, ICS-publications, Washington, Chap. VII, p. 239. 
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phaenomenologishe Forschung. Stein and Wojtyla 'met' three times in this new 
forum, the Analecta. The theme of Volume V is phenomenological anthropology. 
In it are reproduced texts from the Third International Conference of the 
International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society (March 1974). 
Philibert Secretan's paper is called 'Personne, individualité et responsibilité chez 
Edith Stein', whereas Wojtyla himself addresses 'The Intentional Act and the 
Human Act'. In Volume VI (covering the Fourth International Conference of the 
said society, held in January 1975), Wojtyla addresses 'Participation or Alienation', 
whereas Philibert Secretan again talks about Edith Stein: 'The Self and the Other 
in the Thought of Edith Stein'. The discussion is still about phenomenological 
anthropology, and the two contributions of Wojtyla lies in direct prolongation of 
his book Person and Act, which was later to be published in English as the first 
monograph in the series of the Analecta. In Volume XI  (covering the same 
society's conference in March 1976) Secretan, for the third time, writes about 
'Edith Stein on the "Order and Chain of Being"', and Wojtyla adresses this time the 
same topic: 'The Degrees of Being from the Point of View of the Phenomenology 
of Action'. This time the discussion is about metaphysics, but still viewed from the 
standpoint of anthropology. Even if Wojtyla was only actually present on the last 
occasion, while Secretan spoke only at the first two, Wojtyla must have been 
struck at this stage by a similarity of approach between himself and Stein, and 
above all by their common interest in the human person. It is probably in these 
meetings of the minds that Wojtyla came to 'know' Stein8. 
 
 
b. Common masters 
 
                                                 
8 Wojtyla seems to have encouraged Ingarden, whom he knew in Krakow, to give his appreciation of 
Steins philosophical contribution, resulting in his "Die philosophischen Forschungen Edith Steins" in 
Waltraud Herbstrith (ed.): Edith Stein - eine grosse Glaubenszeugerin, Ploger Verlag Anweiler, 1986 
This, however, testifies only to the fact that Wojtyla did not know her work at the time, and George 
Kalinowsky therefore rightly underlines that his position was reached independantly of Stein ("E. 
Stein et K. Wojtyla sur la personne", p. 545 - 561). The comparison Kalinowski attempts to make 
regarding the human person suffers, however, by the lack of sources available to him at the time: 
Aufbau der menschlichen Person and Was ist der Mensch?  were published only later. Wojtyla's 
philosophical formation is described e.g. in Buttiglione, Rocco: La pensée de Karol Wojtyla, 
Communio, Fayard, 1982. 
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Both 'came' to Göttingen to work, Stein primarily with Husserl, Wojtyla primarily 
with Scheler. Wojtyla 'came', even though not in person, after having completed a 
full education in theology, his primary degree not being in philosophy. He was, so 
to speak, a 'mature student' at Göttingen. Stein, on the contrary, was attracted by 
phenomenology from her earliest youth. Theology would be acquired (not without 
struggle) with the help of Thomas Aquinas, much later on in her career. 
 
Husserl (1859 - 1938) is credited with being the ‘Father of phenomenology’. He 
became known to Stein through Breslau seminars on the psychology of thought. In 
the course of these, she kept coming across references to Husserl’s 1900-01 work, 
Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations), and became convinced that 
Husserl was, as she later put it, “the philosopher of our age”9. In the Logical 
Investigations Husserl rejected what he had come to understand as his own earlier 
psychologism, and proposed in its stead a new science which was to investigate 
the phenomena in their very act of appearance, and distill their eidetic structures, 
without any theoretical prejudgement. This was the science of phenomenology, 
and pure logic as well as the whole edifice of science was to be founded on it. Its 
motto was Zu den Sachen Selbst! (To the things themselves!) By discarding 
psychologism, subjective idealism and naturalism, Husserl intended to analyze 
logical phenomena in their purity. Transforming Brentano's descriptive 
phenomenology, conscious acts were to be scrutinized according to their 
intentionality, i.e. in their structure of being a mental act (intentio) directed 
towards something (intentum). But intentional acts were also to be investigated 
according to their varying degrees of fulfilment, the highest degree being certain 
evidence. From around 1905  Husserl began practising what he called the 
'reduction'. It implied a concern to focus on the intentional act in which the object 
was given, to the point of reducing the intentional object to it. Husserl would from 
then on talk about “transcendental phenomenology”. Already the 1913 work Ideen 
zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologishen Philosophie, (Ideas 
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy) bears 
the mark of this crucial change. Subsequent works would confirm this direction.  
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Stein met Husserl for the first time in 1913, and found a man who had come to 
think that the philosophical programme she had first been attracted by should be 
taken forward in a somewhat different direction. This direction would disappoint 
Stein, just as it disappointed Scheler, Conrad Martius, Von Hildebrand and many 
others of the early phenomenologists, because they felt it departed from 
experience. Much as they revered the one whom they called 'The Master', they 
responded to this new direction by endeavouring to develop the philosophical 
programme in the direction which they thought it should take. For Stein, the 
disappointment would be the first step in the direction of an intersubjective 
metaphysics — a path which would later lead her on to Christianity and Christian 
mysticism. 
 
Max Scheler (1874 - 1928) claimed to have developed the phenomenological 
method independently of Husserl. Feeling on this account less indebted than did 
the young phenomenologists, he was even more critical than them of Husserl’s 
transcendental turn. Scheler had never in fact been at any of Husserl’s classes, and 
thus was not, in any strict sense, a pupil of Husserl. However, he had known 
Husserl since 1901 and had often corresponded with him. When Scheler had his 
licence to teach withdrawn (as a consequence of the scandals that flourished 
around his two divorces), Husserl invited him to Göttingen, where he lectured 
privately with much success. His aim was to construct an ethics on a 
phenomenological foundation, distinct on the one hand from the dominant Kantian 
formalism, and, on the other, from consequentialist utilitarianism. Ethics, 
according to Scheler, does not depend on a single formal principle, such as the 
categorical imperative, nor on the factual consequences of the act, but rather on the 
values sought to be realised by the acting person. Values, he believed, are neither 
abstract principles nor particular material things. They are the importance given to 
particular things, and therefore detectable in emotions. As such they can be 
analysed phenomenologically, and they form a hierarchy — the spiritual and the 
personal ones taking precedence over the sensible and the vital ones. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
9 Stein, Edith: Life in a Jewish Family,  Chap. V.5, p. 219. 
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To Stein, Scheler embodied ‘the phenomenon of genius’10. To Wojtyla, on the 
other hand, Husserl was the unquestioned founder of phenomenology. Stein knew 
Scheler, and debated with him, but she considered Husserl alone as her teacher. 
Wojtyla studied Scheler with the intention of developing the foundations of a 
Christian ethics from the latter's premises, but in the end found his theories 
wanting. Phenomenology, however, retained Wojtyla’s respect right into his 
pontificate. 
 
Historically speaking, Phenomenology derived from Scholasticism (through 
Husserl’s teacher, Brentano (1838 – 1917)), not only its basic concept of 
intentionality, but also some elements of its analysis pertaining to the concepts of 
object and subject. This is why neither Stein, as she discovered Thomas Aquinas, 
nor Wojtyla, when he decided to investigate Scheler, came unprepared to the task. 
 
Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274) taught at Paris, Orvieto, Rome, Viterbo and 
Naples, at the time when the idea of the university was still young. He conceived it 
as his vocation to confront (and to synthesise in writing) Christian thought with 
the philosophical heritage of Greece and Rome. At the centre of his philosophical 
system was Being, considered as substance in the wake of Aristotle, but also as 
participated Idea, as Plato had held. Already the orchestration of this philosophical 
synthesis, and its blending with the Christian thought of the Church Fathers (and 
of Augustine in particular), demonstrates the ease with which Thomas conducted 
his thinking. His success, however, was gradually magnified over the centuries, as 
his writings became standard study for clerics and philosophers alike. The 
Reformation condemned the kind of synthesis declaring it offensive to the purity 
of the Faith, whereas Catholics in reaction clung even tighter to what they 
considered to be both reasonable and worthy of God. This controversy conditioned 
the development of Thomism. 
 
Wojtyla knew Aquinas through his seminary formation in Krakow, as well as 
through Père Garrigou-Lagrange O.P. at the Angelicum in Rome. Thomism 
became for him a foundation to build on or a startingpoint for personal 
                                                 
10 Ibid. Chap. V.5, p. 218. 
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reflection11, and it was as such that he transmitted it to his students12. He studied 
with them in seminar form the entire Summa Theologiae. Stein came to study 
Aquinas when she, at the request of Father Erich Przywara, in 1925, started to 
translate De Veritate into German. She made the effort to understand Aquinas 
from her phenomenological point of view, and to translate his terms into its idiom. 
The result was a fresh understanding of the presuppositions of Thomistic thought, 
an appreciation which could hardly be gained by anyone whose first formation it 
was.  
 
St. John of the Cross was the common master in mysticism of Stein and Wojtyla: 
Wojtyla wrote his first doctorate, and Stein her last book, on the thought of the 
Carmelite mystic. The tradition of adopting masters in philosophy, mysticism, art 
or in any other spiritual discipline is in fact not unlike the rabbinic tradition known 
to Jesus of Nazareth. The Academy, of course, was a Greek invention, and the 
University a medieval one, but the very idea of a teacher teaching in a tradition 
recurs in intellectual as well as in practical disciplines and arts. In this sense Jesus 
of Nazareth is of course the common Master of Stein and Wojtyla.  
 
 
c. Common pursuits 
 
Stein had gone to Göttingen out of an irresistible drive: “I could not proceed with 
anything except on the basis of some inner drive. My decisions emerged from a 
level of depth which I myself was unable to grasp clearly. But once something had 
emerged into consciousness and taken a definite shape in my mind, then nothing 
could hold me back.”13 This drive was on more than one occasion to bring her 
close to total exhaustion — as she finished her doctorate, and as she decided to 
give up her academic career in order to teach with the Dominican nuns in Speyer. 
She first understood this 'drive' as a vocation to philosophy. It led her to 
phenomenology and, through the parting with Husserl, into the utter uncertainty of 
                                                 
11 Weigel: Witness to Hope, p. 87. 
12 Ibid. p. 95. 
13 Stein: Life in a Jewish Family, p. 94. 
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an academic world closed in the first instance to women, and in the course of time 
also to Jews. As no satisfactory outcome lay immediately ahead, the pursuit was 
bound to either broaden out or to dry up. The years of frustration before she 
accepted the teaching-post in Speyer were probably the most fruitful, for it was 
during these that she wrote her three phenomenological treatises: Psychic 
Causality, Individual and Community, and On the State. During this period she 
also requested to be baptised. The pursuit deepened. 
 
In the outlook of John Paul II, the desire for God commands a double commitment 
- to the person, and to truth14. In reading about the life of Stein while preparing for 
her canonisation, he must have been touched by the evidence that she was 
someone dedicated to truth and to individual persons also, and who, through this 
double commitment, discovered the unity of both in God.  
 
d. Common problems 
 
At the centre of the philosophical preoccupations of both Stein and Wojtyla there 
lies, as has already been said, the human person. Their different orbits around this 
common theme, however, take them into different regions of the sky. Stein, the 
phenomenologist, would study psychology, politics, and finally theology because 
the study of the person could not reach completion without it. Wojtyla, the 
theologian, would describe the role of the act in the formation of personality in 
order to construct a Christian ethics.  
 
Their focus on the person would also be for both thinkers the point of intersection 
between philosophy and theology. Stein experiences the purely philosophical 
investigation of the person as incomplete and is pushed into theological 
anthropology when she endeavours to comprehend fully the person. Wojtyla 
likewise uncovers the openness towards the transcendent of the acting person. To 
him the acting person is fulfilled only in the act of love, and the commandment of 
love of neighbour therefore completes philosophical anthropology perfectly 'from 
above'.  
10 
 Wojtyla's personal reasons for pointing towards Stein (the places, masters, pursuits 
and problems they had in common) are all concerned with the similarity between 
himself and her. This similarity, however, is intelligable and open because it 
reflects the universality of the experience they shared. 
 
 
2. Edith Stein as Symbol 
 
Wojtyla also has a practical reason to point towards Edith Stein in Fides et Ratio. 
Her symbolic character communicates quite clearly both the harmony of faith and 
reason reflected in a human life, and the ultimate wisdom of God which is the 
Cross.  
 
The word 'symbol' comes from the Greek συμβολον, which refers to the ancient 
practice of cutting a token in two, so that the two people in possession of the bits 
can recognise each other for the purpose of some transaction. In modern language 
a symbol is a sign which, by synthesizing a complexity of meaning, evokes or 
represents it, as the cross symbolises Christianity, the queen her country and the 
child a hope for the future. A symbol can rarely be confined to one particular 
significance at the exclusion of all others, however. The child, for example, 
symbolizes not only hope for the future but also vulnerability, and work related to 
its protection.   
 
The Pope also is a symbol, even a sign of contradiction: a title he chose for one of 
his books15. The symbolic quality of his person renders his actions significant to 
people around the globe, and makes his task very delicate and demanding.  
 
Edith Stein is symbolic in her roles as reformer, disciple and leader. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
14 Canonisation homily. 
15Sign of Contradiction, St. Paul's Publications, Middlegreen, Slough, 1979 
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She is reformer in her roles as a professional woman and philosopher. In her day 
these were still very difficult roles to interpret in an acceptable way, but Stein 
combined massive intellectual power with sacrificial tenderness, in a manner 
which seem to have appeared to her own public as beautiful. Indeed her 
graciousness is still refreshing, being generally agreeable to feminists and 
conservatives alike16: her philosophy of woman is discussed widely. 
 
As a disciple her martyrdom is symbolic. Born on the Feast of Yom Kippur (the 
Atonement), she came to have a singular understanding of the power of expiation. 
A premonition of her death made her choose for her name in religion Teresa 
Benedicta of the Cross, because she accepted the saving power of the death of the 
Messiah for herself also. She died a Jew, of course, like Christ. 
 
As a leader she was the symbol of the Jews trapped in the heart of Europe: outcast 
and idolised,  accomplished and sacrificed, she reckoned herself a scapegoat, a 
holocaust for Europe. Because she accepted this destiny for the sake of 'her people' 
- Jews, Christians, Germans alike - , she makes much sense as a Patroness of 
Europe.  
 
The symbol Edith Stein has also been 'a sign of contradiction'. Her philosophical 
achievements were denigrated, but also assimilated by philosophers close to her17; 
her Christian monasticism was resented, as well as admired by her family18; and 
her canonisation was applauded by Jews, but also regretted as an assault against 
the memory of the Holocaust19. Symbols may be helpful to us because they do not 
restrict our thinking, or even confine it in a particular direction. They glow with 
meaning and puzzle us, like fire. John Paul II's practical reason for referring to 
                                                 
16 McAlister, Linda Lopez: "Essential differences" in Philosophy Today, 37 (Spring 1993) p. 70 - 77. 
17 See Sawicki, Marianne: Body, Text and Science. The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the 
Phenomenology of Edith Stein, (Boston, Kluwer, 1997) where a detailed investigation of Stein's works 
for others under their name is undertaken.  
18 Several of Edith's family-members have collaborated in editions of her philosophy, e,g. the nieces 
Susanne Batzdorf and Waltraut Stein. 
19 Concerning Stein's relationship with Judaism much has been written by both Jews and Christians. 
For an introduction to the problem see Herbstrith, Waltraud: Erinnere dich - vergiss es nicht: Edith 
Stein - christlich-judische Perspectiven, Annweiler und Essen, Plöger, 1990; translated by Susanne 
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Stein is that her symbolic quality makes her visible from afar like a torch, even if a 
multiplicity of interpretations of her life remain possible. 
 
 
3. Edith Stein as Philosopher 
 
 
At the centre of Stein's life and symbolic character stands her vocation as a 
philosopher. Wojtyla's personal and practical reasons for pointing towards her are 
therefore rooted in this objective reason: she was an outstanding Christan 
philosopher, indeed among the greatest of the twentieth century.  
 
We are fortunate today to have even more of Stein's philosophical writings than 
those she herself planned for publication. This is due to the Carmelites, the Stein-
Archives and to the Herder-editors of Edith Steins Werke (ESW)20, which now in 
addition has planned a critical Edith Stein Gesamt Ausgabe (ESGA) in 24 
volumes21. The translation and publication of the Collected Works of Edith Stein 
(CWES) in English is due to the ICS-publications of Washington DC22. 
 
Stein's life and work can be divided into four periods, each marking a definite step 
in her philosophical development23:  
                                                                                                                                           
Batzdoff as Never Forget. Christian and Jewish Perspectives on Edith Stein, ICS-publications, 
Washington, 1998.  
20 Edith Steins Werke (ESW), Herausgegeben von Dr. Lucy Gelber and Michael Linssen O.C.D., 
Archivum Carmelitanum Edith Stein, in Zusammenarbeit mit der niederlaendsichen und der deutschen 
Ordensprovinz der unbeschuhten Karmeliten, Herder, Freiburg- Basel - Wien, 1962 - . 
21 The Edith Stein Gesamt Ausgabe (ESGA), is edited by the "Edith Stein Institut" in Würzburg under 
the direction of Michael Linssen O.C.D., in collaboration with Prof. H.-B. Gerl-Falkovitz (Dresden) 
and others. It is planned that 4 volumes will appear every year until the end of 2010, beginning this 
autumn 2000 with the appearance of three volumes: Die Frau, Selbstbildniss in Briefe I and 
Selbstbildniss in Briefe II. The 24 volumes will be published under 5 headings: Biographische 
Schriften (Bd. 1 - 4); Philosophische Schriften (bd. 5 - 12); Schriften zur Anthropologie und 
Padagogik (bd. 13 - 16); Schrifen zur Spiritualität (bd. 17 - 19) and Übersetzungen (bd. 20- 24). 
22 Collected Works of Edith Stein (CWES), ICS-publications, Washington D.C., Vol. 1: Life in a 
Jewish Family; vol. 2: Essays on Woman; vol. 3: On the Problem of Empathy; vol. 4: The Hidden 
Life; vol. 5: Selfportrait in Letters (to appear: vol. 6:); vol. 7: Philosophy of Psychology and the 
Humanities; vol. 8: Knowledge and Faith. 
23 Sawicki's "Chronology of Writings of Edith Stein (1891 - 1942)", available at the Baltimore 
Carmels website, is a helpful reconstruction of the chronology of the Works of Edith Stein, in 
particular as this chronology is not observed by either of the editions of her Collected Works. 
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 1. The phenomenological works of her prime youth comprise On Empathy (her 
doctoral thesis, 1917); Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (with its two 
parts: Sentient Causality, and Individual and Community, 1922) and On the State 
(1925). All of these are phenomenological investigations in dialogue with (as well 
as in reaction to) Husserl's philosophy.  We can broadly characterise this period as 
phenomenological. 
 
2. After she decided to teach with the Dominican Sisters in Speyer she translated 
Newman's Letters and Diary 1801 —1845, and Aquinas' De Veritate. She wrote a 
famous article on the relationship between Husserl's phenomenology and the 
philosophy of Aquinas, to commemorate Husserl's seventieth birthday24, and she 
also held the lectures on the vocation of woman which made her famous in 
Germany. These lectures are collected in one volume under the title Die Frau25. In 
this period she absorbs and comes to grips with thomism. 
 
3. When she gave up her teaching in Speyer she did so in order to dedicate herself 
full-time to academic work. The writings of these years mark Stein's maturity as a 
philosopher, lecturer and writer, and include her Introduction to Philosophy 
(1931), Act and Potency (1931, later expanded into the first part of Finite and 
Eternal Being), and the two essays in anthropology Aufbau der menschlichen 
Person (1932), and Was ist der Mensch?  (1933), which both result from her 
lectures in educational theory given at the Münster Marianum. The engagement 
with the Münster Marianum was interrupted by the Nazi prohibition against 
Jewish professionals, and this was the event which prompted her to write her 
unfinished autobiography Life in a Jewish Family (1933 - 35), and also procured 
her with time to do it. This period is dominated by an interest in anthropology. 
 
                                                 
24"Husserls Phänomenologie und die Philosophie des hl. Thomas v. Aquino: Versuch einer 
Gegenüberstellung." in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung, 
Ergänzungsband, p. 315 - 338, translated in  Baseheart, Mary Catherine: Person in the World, Kluwer, 
Dordrecht, 1997 and, alongside the original dialogue-version rejected by Martin Heidegger, in Stein, 
Edith: Knowledge and Faith (CWES) vol. 8. 
25 CWES, Vol. 2. 
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4. From her Carmel days come Finite and Eternal Being (1935 - 36) and the 
unfinished Science of the Cross (1942). Both were written at the request of her 
superiors. In addition, she composed a series of minor hagiographical writings for 
the edification of the sisters26.  The two major works were both intended for 
publication, but publication of works by Jews had become practically impossible 
in the years following 1939. They were published after the war as the first volumes 
in the series of Edith Steins Werke. The composition of the work Finite and 
Eternal Being makes us characterise this period as ontological. 
 
There is a clear development in Stein's thought. In her youthful writings she was 
concerned with filling the lacunas she saw in Husserl's thinking, while elaborating 
and expanding on the phenomenological method, which she found to be the only 
one that could meet her own scientific standards. Around the time of her baptism, 
in 1922, Christian mysticism became something she felt compelled to explore. In 
and through this meeting with a new discipline, her thought was first confronted 
with, and was later to thrive on, Scholasticism together with its inherent 
Aristotelianism. Whereas she, in the works of her youth, acknowledged the 
existence of an experience of faith, and treated of it among other conscious 
experiences, by the time we come to her later writings, it has penetrated her own 
personality and thought completely. The mature works are no longer so much 
preoccupied with phenomena as they are centered on being. They do, however, 
still find their point of departure in conscious experience, and conscious 
experience is never far away from the ontological analysis.  
 
The theme which underlies this development is the human person. It is Stein's 
efforts to understand the complexity of inner experience, and its anchorage in 
personality as well as in bodily expression, which leads her on to see that the 
person cannot be understood in isolation, either from the physical forces which 
surround it and by which it lives (the energy-levels of consciousness are causally 
related to the body), or from the community of which it is part (our habits of 
thinking are shaped in a community). These factors, which have an impact on 
consciousness, lead her to presuppose a plurality of persons (in contradistinction to 
                                                 
26 Das Verborgene Leben, ESW, vol. , The Hidden Life, CWES vol. 4. 
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Husserl's transcendental ego), constitutive of the world in which they live. It also 
leads her to a more confident approach to reality, which is alive and real with all 
the power which I lend to the personal perspective of the others.  
 
It is still the individual human person who constitutes the centre and summit of her 
later philosophy of being, and therefore brings the phenomenologial method into 
her ontology, as its foundation 'in relation to us'. Its foundation in relation to itself, 
i.e. the foundation it has outside of all reference to any particular human 
perspective, is Being, which to the believer also is accessible as personal in God.   
 
The development of her thought from phenomenology over thomism to 
anthropology and ontology is organic: the elements are present throughout, but 
they are not always in the foreground. To get a clearer grasp of her philosophy, let 
us take a closer look at each of these elements. 
  
 
a. Phenomenology 
 
Stein understood phenomenology to be a method of investigation and an attitude 
of dedication to the meticulous and scientific description of the phenomena as they 
appear27. To suspend our judgement of reality (by the epoché), and to reduce 
experience to what is experienced (by the phenomenological reduction) form part 
of the phenomenological discipline required by the fact that the phenomena stand 
in a (for us) uncertain relationship with what is. These methodological precautions 
leaves us with the stream of consciousness of which the “pure I” is the underlying 
unity. Stein endorsed Husserls descriptive phenomenology of the Logical 
Investigations, as well as the transcendental phenomenology put forward in the 
Ideen I. She maintained, however, that phenomenology was in need of a thorough 
investigation of just that kind of act in which we appreciate the consciousness of 
other people: empathy. Without such an investigation it would remain unclear by 
what means the foreign subject was constituted, and therefore what 
                                                 
27 See for example  On Empathy (CWES Vol. 3), Chapter II, 1. p. 3 - 6 (1 - 4 in the German)  and 5. 
(a), p. 21 - 22 (22 - 23 in the German). 
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intersubjectivity could possibly mean. Her findings in On Empathy was therefore 
intended as a contribution to the phenomenological enterprise. It was only later, 
when working as Husserl's assistant, that Stein realised the distance between 
herself and Husserl. To her, empathy provided a means of obtaining knowledge 
about the world as another sees it. Empathy yielded within consciousness the very 
objectivity of the world as constituted between subjects perceiving it. Here was 
what would provide science with a secure foundation, here was, as she says, true 
πρωτη φιλοσοφια28. For Husserl, empathy, (though he, like Stein, understood it 
to be the means of constituting the other as other,) could not distract him from the 
the course towards transcendental solipsism. To him the ego is not constituted in 
reiterated empathy as a psycho-physical individual person, it is self-constituted. 
The insertion of the I in the world and the understanding of persons therefore 
becomes more problematic. This is why Stein's doctoral thesis on empathy 
simultaneously marks Stein's adherence to, and her departure from Husserl's 
transcendental phenomenology.  
 
The parting evolved into a crisis when Stein, having obtained her degree, was 
engaged as Husserl's assistant for thirteen months. During this period she put in 
order and prepared for publication notes made by Husserl over a number of years - 
the manuscripts finally published after Husserl's death as Ideen II and III. She also 
prepared for publication the Notes on Time Consciousness, which were later to be 
published by Martin Heidegger. It became clearer for Stein during these months 
that Husserl was not prepared to heed the insights gained from Stein’s analysis of 
empathy and the constitution of the  individual person. Stein regarded this as a 
failure, because it left the idea of constitution, in particular intersubjective 
constitution, hanging in the air. Unable to convince him about the need to explore 
inter-subjectivity anew, she asked to be relieved of her duties in order to be able to 
devote more time to her own work. It is against this background that she used her 
theory of empathy as a basis for constructing a Philosophy of Psychology and the 
Humanities 29. In this work she explores how the realms of the soul and of the 
spirit are constituted and thus intends to contribute to the understanding of the 
                                                 
28 On Empathy (CWES Vol. 3), Chapter II, 5. (a), p. 21 (22). 
29 CWES, Vol. 7. 
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foundations of psychology and of the 'sciences of the spirit' 
(Geisteswissenschaften). 
 
In its first part this work analyses the phenomena of causality within the sentient 
soul, i.e. how necessitation, contrary to motivation, occurs and is experienced. The 
purpose is to determine the causal relations between the body and consciousness, 
and to describe the contours of this necessitation, which is radically different from 
that of logical necessitation  or spiritual motivation. Psychology, she claims, 
depends on this distinction, and without having a clear understanding of how 
causation and motivation interact, psychology as a science would be unable to 
determine its own object precisely. 
 
The second part of Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities investigates the 
impact of the community on the individual. It seeks to determine the extent to 
which the individual is influenced by the community, as well as to determine the 
mechanisms through which the community is constituted by individuals. The work 
relies on an analysis of common consiousness in which and through which 
explanations of events and the events themselves make sense. The discipline of 
history, and the other subjects of the  humanities, have their objectivity from and 
in this common consciousness. The analysis of its nature therefore constitutes the 
foundation of the humanities. 
 
The two parts taken together seek to determine what constitutes persons: nature - 
the metabolism of life which penetrates all psychic life; and society - the cultural 
suppositions which determine the conscious life of the individual.  
 
 
b. Thomism 
 
After her baptism Stein was encouraged by her spiritual director, to take up her 
academic studies anew through the study of Thomas Aquinas. The meticulous 
work of translation, commentary and systematisation was not unfamiliar to her. As 
Husserl's assistent she was accustomed to bring into a coherent whole piles and 
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piles of stenographed manuscripts, and as a teacher of Latin and German at the 
Dominicans in Speyer, she had the command of both languages. Above all, 
translation afforded her a way to become familiar with the thought of Thomas 
himself30.  
 
Stein had as a student of Husserl conceived a distaste for mistaking the history of 
philosophy for philosophy itself. In consequence of this, her purpose in translating 
the De Veritate was not philological but systematic: she wanted to translate 
Aquinas, not only into German, but into modern German philosophical idiom and 
thus to bring Thomas' thought into dialogue with Phenomenology. She did this by 
succinctly rendering the meaning, and establishing the relevance, of each article in 
relation to the whole, thus producing a very readable text, one that is closer to 
Thomas' own work than many modern day translations, which incorporate his 
students' work in the form of objections. It appears at first glance to be a 
translation, but in fact the genre is that of a Scholastic commentary, where 
translation and commentary are marked carefully by signs in the "lay-out" and 
where the author's interpretation illuminates both the text commented on and the 
commentators point of view.  
 
The choice of De Veritate among all the works of Aquinas was dictated by 
circumstance and interest alike. However, De Veritate is not the work with the 
most impressive structure among Aquinas' works. It is Saint Thomas' earliest 
series of publically disputed questions, and it consists of twenty-nine such, 
stitched loosely together around the theme of truth. The content, however, testifies 
to the synthesis of Aristotelianism and Christianity which would later be 
systematically developed in the Summa Theologiae, and it exposes Thomas' 
metaphysics of knowledge as precisely that: a metaphysics of knowledge. 
 
                                                 
30 "The translation of the Questiones Disputatae de Veritate constituted for me a necessary way 
towards penetrating the thought of Saint Thomas". Des Hl. Thomas von Aquino Untersuchungen über 
die Wahrheit, in Deutscher Übertragung von Edith Stein, 1. band, Otto Borgmeyer, Breslau, Vorwort. 
My translation. A note to the Husserl and Aquinas-article reads  "I purposely avoid the term 'Thomism' 
since I base my comparison not on any traditional scholastic system but on an overview drawn from 
Thomas' writings." CWES  Vol. 8, p. 137 - 8, translation by Walter Redmond. 
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Stein comments: "The teaching on knowledge (Erkenntnislehre) given (..), is 
rather different from modern epistemology ("Erkenntnistheorie"), as it has 
developed since the Renaissance. It has no claim to be the foundation of all other 
philosophical disciplines, and does not pretend to be a science without 
presuppositions: It is part of a great metaphysics. Knowledge is here a real event, 
which presupposes a threefold world of realities: the uncreated and eternal Spirit 
of God, the world of things created by Him, and the finite spirits created by Him. 
This differentiation in the real world prompts a differentiation of knowledge. So 
that not even a common definition of "knowledge-as-such" is possible."31
 
In the quoted passage Stein looks in vain for a transcendental analysis of 
knowledge. She finds in its stead knowledge understood in relation to being, the 
first concept of the mind. In her later article on the relationship between Husserl 
and Aquinas32, she states that even if we could give an account of knowledge as 
such, it would not be sufficient to account for the limits of human knowledge. This 
is in fact the point where Husserl and Aquinas part ways: "Phenomenology 
proceeds as though our reason had no limits in principle. Certainly, it grants that 
its task is endless and knowledge is an unending process. But it heads straight for 
its goal: that is, the full truth, which as a regulative idea sets the the course it is to 
take. From the perspective of this philosophy there is no other way to the goal. St. 
Thomas' view is also that this is the way of natural reason. Its way is endless, and 
this implies that it can never reach its goal but only approach it step by step. 
Another consequence is that all human philosophy is bound to be fragmentary." 
Thomas, however, "would never admit that this is the only way of knowledge, nor 
that truth is but an idea that must be actualized in an unending process — and 
hence never fully. Full Truth is; there is a knowledge that embraces truth 
completely, a knowledge that, rather than unending process, is unending, infinite, 
fullness at rest. Such is the divine knowledge." The sheer temporality of our 
knowledge proves to us the existence of such Eternal Being, as Stein will show in 
the beginning of Finite and Eternal Being. The distinction between natural and 
supernatural knowledge is therefore not, as Husserl would have it, an empirical 
                                                 
31Ibid. , p. 32 - Commentary to q. 1. My translation. 
32 Husserl and Aquinas: A Comparison in CWES 8, p. 1 - 63. 
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distinction. It is a transcendental one, based on the nature of our knowing as 
temporal and finite. Faith, the basis of supernatural knowledge, is a way to go 
further along the naturally desired way of knowledge, by relying in trust upon an 
infinite Intellect making itself known through Revelation. 
 
 
c. Anthropology  
 
It was Stein's phenomenological anthropology, in particular her understanding of 
the temporality of the ego, which determined her development as a 
phenomenologist and her acceptance of the philosophy of Saint Thomas. She 
investigated the phenomenon of empathy, both in its essence and in its power to 
constitute the psycho-physical individual as well as the person. She founded 
psychology on the constitution of the psycho-physical individual understood in its 
causal and motivational structures and she founded the humanities on the 
constitution of the person caused and motivated by the society of which it is 
constituted as an individual and as a member. Thus Stein's phenomenology of 
intersubjectivity is developed into her mature philosophy of person, which, she 
now contends, cannot be completed without a theological foundation. 
 
Her two most substantial contributions to anthropology, The Structure of the 
Human Person and What is the Human Being?, are complementary and both stem 
from her brief period as a lecturer in 'scientific pedagogics' at Münster. The 
Marianum had embarked on the considerable adventure of developing a new 
Catholic education theory and Stein's twinwork attempts to lay the anthropological 
foundations. In The Structure of the Human Person she discussed the ability of 
various anthropological theories to meet the requirement of providing a foundation 
for education. The anthropology of German idealism, of depth-psychology and of 
existentialism, all fall short of justifying the fundamental attitudes to be 
transmitted by any Catholic education: respect for nature as a given and for its 
laws of development; mutual trust and attention as a precondition for 
understanding; and responsibility towards, as well as trust in, God. Having defined 
the telos of Catholic education, she proceeds to develop an anthropology which 
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takes into account the human being in all its dimensions: as a material thing, an 
organism, an animal, a soul and a social person. She discusses the origin of the 
human species in the light of Darwinism, and the influence and claims of race and 
nationality on the identity of the human person. Finally, she adresses the 
relationship between philosophical and theological anthropology. She claims that 
the human finite being cannot be understood in isolation from the Infinite upon 
which it depends. Moreover, experience does not give us conclusive results as to 
the origin or goal, either of the individual or of the whole of humanity, but 
Revelation, however, is "given to humans, so that they may know what they are 
and what they must do"33. And thus, in so far as anthropology is incomplete 
without knowledge of the beginning and the end of the 'story' about the human 
person, it must be completed by a theological anthropology. However, had we had 
other kinds of privileged access to these realities (through communication with a 
greater spirit, for example), that would perhaps suffice. But given that Revelation 
precisely is such a public communication, it seems satisfactory to accept it as such, 
after some personal probing of its genuine character. 
 
What is a Human Being? was planned as the continuation of the lecture series, but 
was never delivered as such. When Stein could no longer teach she worked the 
prepared material into a scientific study, which, however, has reached us in an 
unfinished state. Its subtitle: A Theological Anthropology, reveals that it was 
thought to constitute both the prolongation and the foundation of the Structure of 
the Human Person, in accordance with the expectations raised by the last part of 
this work. It treats of the common nature of human individuals, of the creation of 
the human being and of the Fall, of the Saviour and the state of the saved. It 
reaches from the direct creation of the soul by God to the sacraments, and 
examines the value and dignity of the human person. The questions of origin and 
end, indispensable for the educator, are thus addressed fully in this work.  
 
 
d. Ontology 
 
                                                 
33 Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person, ESW bd. XVI, p. 194. 
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Stein attributed to the fleeting nature of human experience (its temporality and 
finitude), the finding that purely philosophical knowledge of the beginning or the 
end is beyond our reach. Even so, the I of my experience seems pointless if it is 
confined within the narrow limits of my own experience. In thinking, moreover, 
the I is brought into contact with what lies beyond the fleeting now, because it 
implies identification, which, even as it is coming into being and passing away in 
the stream of consciousness, nevertheless transcends time into the realm of the 
ideal. Yet thinking is unmistakably a capacity of the human intellect, and in it we 
have access to what transcends time: the eternal. Stein's great attempt at an ascent 
to the meaning of Being, Finite and Eternal Being, opens with these reflections. 
 
Developed out of her second attempt at Habilitation, (namely Act and Potency), 
the work, which she called 'her spiritual testament', centers on the question of 
being. "The confrontation of Thomistic and phenomenological thought follows in 
the objective treatment of this question"34. Stein first ‘deduces’ being from 
conscious experience, by showing how the latter would be unthinkable without the 
former: being is first simply understood as what is identifiable by and in thought. 
She thereafter proceeds through an analysis of the various forms of being 
(temporal, finite, infinite and eternal, on the one hand; essential, real, actual and 
potential, on the other), to a specific analysis of substance (form and matter). She 
then approaches the characteristics of being (Seiendes) as such (the 
transcendentals), before she enters into the domain of the meaning of being (Sinn 
des Seins). This she founds in the mysterious personal individuality of a 
substantial I.  
 
In the paragraph entitled "On the meaning and possibility of a Christian 
philosophy" Stein reflects specifically on the relationship between faith and 
reason. She initially poses the problem in terms of the relationship between 
medieval and modern philosophy. The medieval philosophers saw in Revelation a 
measure of all truth, even as they regarded philosophy as an enterprize with its 
own distinct identity. Maritain, Stein argues, sees this distinctiveness as a 
distinctiveness of object. This, according to Stein, is incorrect, firstly because the 
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object of philosophy is not distinct from any of the the other sciences, but in stead 
founds them as it defines their respective objects. Secondly because philosophy as 
wisdom is the perfect opus rationis, the last rational explanation obtainable of the 
meaning of being. 
 
Maritain had said that Christian philosophy was a special way of being (Stein says 
Zustand) of philosophy. He held that the spiritual ability to search and hold truth 
was strengthened through grace, and that philosophy was enriched by the concepts 
developed within theology (e.g. the concept of the person). Moreover he states that 
the world itself changes as it is seen through the eyes of faith. This means that the 
believer, in performing the perfect opus rationis, would be irrational if he relied 
only on natural reason, having at his disposal a superior source of truth. Maritain 
was ready to admit that moral philosophy could not be conducted as pure 
philosophy. He did not, however, as Stein does, admit this for the remainder of 
philosophy. "The fundamental truths of our faith - concerning Creation, the Fall, 
Redemption and fulfillment, - shed a light after which it is impossible that a pure 
philosophy, i.e. a philosophy relying exclusively on natural reason, could fulfil its 
task of accomplishing a perfectum opus rationis."35
 
This may imply that philosophy is accomplished through theology, but not that it 
is accomplished as theology. Christian philosophy is a seeing-together, a 
Zusammenschau, of Reason and Reveleation. But because faith is a 'dark light', 
even if it is the closest we come to God's vision, every ray of light such philosophy 
can cast is very precious. 
 
As the Pope points towards Edith Stein in Fides et Ratio, he points towards a 
philosopher who dedicated her life to philosophy, and who centered her 
contribution on the human person.  
 
 
Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                           
34 Endliches und Ewiges Sein, ESW Vol. II,  p. XIII. 
35 Ibid.  p. 24. 
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 I have tried to show the reasons which the present Pope could have for mentioning 
Edith Stein in the encyclical Fides et Ratio. They have been divided into three 
kinds: personal, practical and objective. Among the personal reasons I have 
mentioned the places, masters, pursuits and problems they have in common. As a 
practical reason I have alluded to Stein's symbolic character, which makes her 
appealing to very different people. As the objective reason I have listed her 
philosophy, and briefly developed its main elements: phenomenology, Thomism, 
anthropology and ontology. I hope that it has against this background become 
more clear why Fides et Ratio refers explicitly to the work of Edith Stein, and why 
John Paul II points her out among the thinkers who have conciliated a belief in the 
Word of God with philosophy and scientific method. I have not seen it as my task 
to compare the respective philosophies of Karol Wojtyla and Edith Stein, either 
concerning the relationship between faith and reason or anything else, - this would 
be a very worthwhile task, but of another order. I have simply sought to shed light 
on the reasons John Paul II had to point out Edith Stein as a Christian thinker, and 
hope also to have introduced the interested reader to some of the thoughts of her 
rich and inspiring work.  
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